ISLAMABAD: A new Global Counter Terrorism Review research dossier has documented a sustained pattern of political accommodation involving Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistani Taliban, identifying 16 dated instances in which former prime minister Imran Khan personally advocated, facilitated or defended talks, reconciliation or rehabilitation involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Titled “The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Terrorism Conundrum: Political Accommodation and Government Accountability,” the review covers the period from 2009 to September 2026 and places the political chronology alongside security data compiled by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). It says its assessment is based on an open-source research trail and distinguishes the TTP from the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda and other terrorists organisations.
According to the review, the strongest criticism concerns what it describes as a documented pattern of political accommodation of terrorist actors. It says Khan repeatedly promoted negotiations, his federal government pursued talks with the TTP, while PTI governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa financed Darul Uloom Haqqania, a seminary associated with senior Afghan Taliban figures.
2021 talks produced temporary ceasefire
The report says the policy moved beyond political rhetoric in 2021, when the federal government opened direct talks with the TTP.
On October 1, 2021, Khan publicly confirmed negotiations with sections of the TTP and said terrorists who surrendered their weapons could be forgiven and return to ordinary life. According to the review, the Afghan Taliban facilitated the process.
The government subsequently announced a ceasefire with the TTP on November 8, 2021. However, the TTP announced an end to the ceasefire on December 9, accusing the government of failing to meet its commitments.
AFP, cited by the review, reported on December 9 that authorities had released up to 100 TTP prisoners during the preceding days. The dossier describes the releases as among the clearest reported concessions associated with the talks.
Haqqania funding examined
The dossier identifies provincial funding for Darul Uloom Haqqania as its most tangible financial evidence of government support for an institution associated with the Afghan Taliban’s religious and political environment.
It records Rs300 million allocated to the seminary in June 2016, with later reporting stating that the amount had been released. An additional Rs275 million was reported as being processed in February 2018, while Rs80.16 million was reported released in April 2022 during PTI’s rule in KP.
The review notes that Khan personally defended the 2016 grant, saying Haqqania had accepted reforms in exchange for the funding.
It cautions, however, that a complete financial and policy audit would require sanction orders, release schedules, expenditure certificates and evidence showing whether promised educational reforms were actually implemented.
16 statements trace Khan’s position on negotiations
The review traces Khan’s position from 2009, when he opposed treating the Swat conflict primarily through military operations and advocated a political settlement, to repeated calls for negotiations with terrorists in 2011 and 2013.
It records his 2013 proposal to allow the TTP to establish an office in Pakistan to facilitate peace talks and subsequent statements defending the proposal. In 2014, the PTI-led KP government was also reported to have offered facilities and security for negotiations.
The dossier identifies further statements in 2023 in which Khan defended plans to bring TTP members and their families back to Pakistan and argued that rehabilitation was necessary following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
Review notes TTP expansion during talks
The research cites a 2022 NACTA briefing to a Senate committee, as reported by media, stated that the TTP had used the talks period to expand its footprint and increase its strength.
The review says this finding is relevant to assessing whether negotiations created space for terrorists’ recovery, while also cautioning that the broader resurgence of the TTP involved multiple factors, including militant reunification and developments following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
KP terrorist attacks rose sharply between 2021 and 2025
Using PIPS annual security reports, the dossier records a substantial increase in terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The report calculates that the 2025 figure was 3.72 times the 2021 level, representing a 272.1% increase. It stresses that the figures cover terrorist attacks involving multiple terrorists groups and do not establish that PTI or any other political party was responsible for individual attacks.
Year-wise KP Attacks and Casualties
2021: 111 attacks | 169 killed | 122 injured
2022: 169 attacks | 294 killed | 393 injured
2023: 174 attacks | 422 killed | 782 injured
2024: 295 attacks | 509 killed | 517 injured
2025: 413 attacks | 581 killed | 698 injured
For 2025, PIPS attributed 248 attacks to six southern districts, North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Dera Ismail Khan, accounting for about 60% of the provincial total.
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Review calls for examination of policy safeguards
The dossier argues that the key accountability questions concern whether concessions carried enforceable conditions, whether released or returning individuals were monitored and whether vulnerable districts received sustained protection.
The research also records continued advocacy for dialogue during subsequent PTI rule in KP, including Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur’s 2024 call for negotiations and Chief Minister Sohail Afridi’s opposition to military operations and preference for dialogue in January 2026.
Electoral cooperation also examined
Beyond negotiations with the TTP, the review examines reported electoral cooperation between PTI candidates and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), stressing that ASWJ and the TTP are separate organisations.
It cites reports of reciprocal electoral cooperation involving a PTI candidate and an ASWJ leader in Karachi’s Malir constituency in 2018, as well as reports that ASWJ claimed to have backed dozens of PTI candidates. The review presents these episodes as part of its broader examination of political accommodation and access for terrorist or sectarian actors.
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Review acknowledges limits of causation
Importantly, the dossier itself cautions against directly attributing the rise in terrorism to any single political party or policy. It says the PIPS trend cannot isolate the effects of negotiations, resettlement, policing or developments in Afghanistan, and that the five-year period covers changes in both federal and provincial leadership.
The review therefore frames its central question around the durability and safeguards of the policies rather than claiming that the documented political decisions alone caused the subsequent rise in terrorist violence.
The research, dated October 1, 2026, concludes that the record warrants scrutiny of negotiations, prisoner releases, rehabilitation proposals, institutional funding, and political engagement with terrorist-linked actors, and calls for accountability across institutions based on their respective roles.
