BRUSSELS: The European Union’s engagement with the Taliban has come under scrutiny over whether efforts to secure cooperation on deporting Afghan nationals are delivering meaningful concessions on counterterrorism and human rights.
In an analysis published by The National Interest on October 9, Eldar Mamedov argues that the EU’s migration-focused approach risks undermining its stated principles while giving Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities greater diplomatic leverage.
Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign policy expert and former Latvian diplomat who has advised the European Parliament’s Social Democrats on foreign affairs since 2009, wrote in his article that the debate intensified after European officials met a five-member Taliban delegation in Brussels in June 2026. Led by Taliban foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi, the delegation held talks focused on the return of Afghan nationals who do not have a legal right to remain in Europe.
Belgium issued the delegation visas valid for a limited period and restricted to its territory. The meeting exposed divisions within Europe, with some officials supporting engagement on migration while others warned that hosting Taliban representatives could lend legitimacy to the regime.
Migration Takes Priority
European officials described the talks as technical discussions rather than a step towards formal recognition of the Taliban administration. However, Mamedov argues that the focus on deportations risks pushing human rights and security concerns into the background.
The Taliban delegation reportedly sought control over Afghan consular offices in European countries in exchange for cooperation on returns. Such a move could provide the authorities in Kabul with a symbolic diplomatic gain, the analysis argues.
The EU has set five benchmarks for possible recognition of the Taliban, including counterterrorism commitments, respect for human rights, women’s rights, girls’ access to education and inclusive governance.
Mamedov says the Taliban has made little meaningful progress towards meeting those conditions since returning to power in 2021.
Militant Networks
The analysis raises concerns about militant organisations operating from Afghan territory, including Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda.
Citing United Nations assessments, it refers to more than 20 militant organisations operating in Afghanistan and estimates of up to 13,000 foreign fighters, including approximately 6,000 TTP militants and 2,000–3,000 ISKP operatives, alongside hundreds of Al Qaeda members.
Pakistan has repeatedly warned that militants operating from Afghan territory pose a threat to its security. The article cites Pakistan’s reported figures of more than 5,300 terrorism incidents and over 1,200 fatalities in 2025 linked to militants operating from Afghanistan, as well as more than 60 identified militant camps and staging areas.
The threat is not confined to Pakistan. The analysis also refers to cross-border attacks in Tajikistan in November 2025 that killed five Chinese nationals and injured five others.
European officials have also acknowledged security concerns. EU Special Envoy Gilles Bertrand said in June 2026 that terrorist safe havens, training camps, arms supply chains and financing networks continued to operate inside Afghanistan, according to the article.
Mamedov argues that engagement with the Taliban will have limited value unless it produces verifiable action against these networks.
Girls Denied Education
Human rights remain another central concern. According to UNICEF, more than 2.6 million Afghan girls have been denied access to secondary education since the Taliban returned to power. Restrictions on women’s employment, movement and participation in public life have further narrowed their opportunities.
The analysis also highlights discrimination against Shia Hazaras and other ethnic and religious minorities, including restrictions on religious observances and limited representation in public institutions.
It cites estimates that the Pashtun occupy around 90% of approximately 1,185 senior Taliban leadership positions, while women hold none. Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras account for substantially smaller shares of those positions.
Mamedov argues that these patterns reflect a broader failure to establish inclusive governance, another of the EU’s stated benchmarks for engagement.
Call for action
The analysis recommendations include action against militant infrastructure associated with TTP, ISKP and Al Qaeda, restoring girls’ access to secondary and higher education, and ending discrimination against Shia Hazaras and other minority communities.
The central question for European policymakers is whether cooperation on migration can be separated from the wider security and human rights record of the Taliban authorities.
The EU maintains that technical engagement does not amount to formal recognition. However, critics argue that repeated dealings without enforceable conditions could gradually normalise the regime while delivering few substantive concessions.
The debate highlights the challenge facing Europe as it seeks to manage migration while maintaining pressure on the Taliban over security, governance and fundamental rights.
