NEW DELHI, India: The Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think tank, has acknowledged that Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) could counter India’s conventional military superiority, preventing territorial gains. The overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998 has cast a nuclear shadow over the subcontinent, further complicating their long-standing rivalry. The introduction of TNWs by Pakistan adds a new layer of uncertainty to their volatile relationship. Pakistan perceives India’s military modernization, bolstered by economic and technological advancements, as a threat, and has developed TNWs to neutralize India’s conventional superiority.
Proponents of Pakistan’s TNW program argue that these weapons serve as a vital deterrent against large-scale Indian aggression, forcing India to exercise restraint to avoid rapid escalation to nuclear conflict. This perspective maintains a precarious form of deterrence stability. However, critics contend that TNWs lower the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk of unintended escalation or miscalculation. The debate hinges on whether the perceived deterrent effect genuinely enhances stability or if the heightened risk of unintended nuclear escalation outweighs potential benefits.
Nuclear weapons are typically associated with massive destructive potential, high yield rates, prolonged residual radiation, and extended fallout. However, TNWs are characterized by limited range and yield, designed to restrict destruction to specific battlefield areas rather than broader strategic targets. Pakistan’s development of TNWs is largely seen as a counter to India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine,’ which involves rapid military strikes to inflict significant attrition on Pakistani forces.
Pakistan’s security strategy after 1998 has focused on countering the perceived Indian threat through nuclear deterrence. Among these, nuclear deterrence is the most sustainable option, making the strategic equation between India and Pakistan more precarious. Former Indian Ambassador G. Parthasarathy noted that Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons aimed to balance India’s conventional superiority.
The conditions under which Pakistan might use its TNWs were outlined by Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai, Head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). He stated that nuclear weapons would be used only if Pakistan’s existence is at stake, elaborating on specific thresholds: territorial conquest, destruction of major military assets, economic strangulation, and political destabilization or internal subversion.
Expert Bernard Brodie emphasized that the primary goal after the advent of nuclear weapons should be to avert wars, not to win them. This concept ensures that no nuclear-armed nation would emerge victorious in a nuclear conflict, as the destruction would be mutual, whether the weapons are strategic or tactical.
Pakistan’s TNWs might deter India’s conventional military superiority from translating into territorial gains. The mere threat of nuclear escalation, even at a tactical level, could compel India to maintain a measured response in a potential conflict. However, the actual use of TNWs carries immense risks of uncontrollable escalation and catastrophic humanitarian consequences. However, even Indian experts also admitted that Islamabad’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) could counter New Delhi’s conventional military superiority and this gives upper hand to Pakistan.
