Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s message of congratulations to Prime Minister Narendra Modi on forming the Modi-3.0 government on June 9, 2024, has germinated optimism about the ice breaking between the two arch-rivals, India and Pakistan. Similar brief felicitation messages were exchanged in March 2024 between the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan and his Indian counterpart. Realistically, it’s too early to predict the probability of the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan during Premier Modi’s third tenure.
The Pakistani ruling elite has expressed its desire to improve Pakistan and India relations for the sake of South Asian peace and prosperity. In his message of felicitation to Modi, the former Prime Minister and presently the President of the ruling party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Mr. Nawaz Sharif, expressed his desire for collective peace in South Asia. Instead of responding positively, Prime Minister Modi repeated Delhi’s allegations of cross-border terrorism. His foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, verbalized a similar mood of bellicose jingoism. On June 11, he said, “With Pakistan, we would want to find a solution to the issue of years-old cross-border terrorism. That cannot be the policy of a good neighbor.” Thus, the Indian ruling elite seems least prepared to respond to Pakistani leaders’ positive proposals.
Indeed, the resumption of a dialogue process between Islamabad and New Delhi is imperative for South Asian strategic stability. Ironically, the trends are not favorable for restoring full diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan. The following paragraphs spelled out a few factors precipitating a pessimistic conclusion about India—Pakistan relations.
First, the Indian ruling elite lacks the courage to initiate a peace dialogue with Pakistan due to domestic limitations. During the last three general elections, Mr. Modi and his cohorts publicized an antagonistic narrative about Pakistan to garner the support of ultranationalist and Hindutva forces to win the elections. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) election campaign pivoted around anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan rhetoric. The party will opt for a similar strategy in the forthcoming state elections, i.e., communal politics.
Secondly, the BJP failed to win the expected two-thirds majority in the 2024 general elections (18th Lok Sabha elections), as predicted in the exit polls. The lack of a two-thirds majority spoiled Modi’s determination to constitutionally turn the country into a Hindu majoritarian state, i.e., a fascistic ‘Hindu Rashtra’. Indeed, it’s a big shock to his Hindu nationalist politics, which is destined to reshape India’s secular democracy.
Thirdly, the election results exposed Modi’s policies’ acceptability beyond his stronghold. The analysts opined that the people of India asserted their prowess to defend the Constitution and the secular democratic character of the republic. However, the puzzle is that instead of accepting the people’s verdict and addressing the grievances of the minorities, the Modi government will double down on the Hindutva ideology to reinforce its Hindu base by pursuing an intensely Hindutva agenda involving
actions such as a uniform civil code, ending reservations for Muslims, and seizing and converting mosques in Varanasi and Mathura into temples.
Fourthly, the BJP won 240 seats in the 543-member Lok Sabha. It is 32 seats short of a majority to constitute a government. Conversely, the Congress-led newly formed coalition INDIA has won 234 seats, 38 seats short of a majority. Only six seats difference raises two pertinent questions: Does Modi’s 3.0 government survive for more than six months? Can his alliance partners trust him for five years?
Fifthly, the Modi-3.0 government depends on its allied parties (especially two regional parties, the Janata Dal (United) from Bihar and the Telugu Desam Party from Andhra Pradesh) to stay in power. The allied parties do not subscribe to BJP’s extremist Hindutva politics, especially social agenda, issue of caste, etc. Despite the BJP’s dependency on allies, it would not temperate its hard-line nationalist agenda for the sake of sustaining and furthering its support base among religious and nationalist supremacists. Moreover, Mr. Modi’s 25 years of governance experience (chief minister of Gujarat and prime minister of India) reveals that he is a fascistic chief executive with no experience in running a coalition government.
Sixthly, the Indian minorities, particularly Muslims, have been suffering due to the BJP’s politico-religious policies. The intra-state conflicts in the country have increased during the last decade. Instead of identifying the internal causes of these conflicts, the Modi cabinet members frequently allege Pakistan for their domestic law and order situation. BJP leaders often accuse Pakistan of supporting cross-border militancy. They intimidate to conduct surgical strikes inside Pakistan and also take over Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir. These provocative avowals increase bellicosity between Islamabad and New Delhi.
Sevently, it is an open secret that the Indian intelligence RAW has been running a network of assassins within Pakistan. It provides financial and material support to the militant groups involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan. This tactic of the Modi government to bleed Pakistan obstructs any positive initiative between Pakistan and India.
Eightly, India has overly threatened to modify the Indus Waters Treaty’s dispute settlement provisions unilaterally. It also boycotted a court of arbitration hearing at the Hague on Indian hydroelectric projects on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers disputed by water-stressed Pakistan. New Delhi’s usage of the Indus Basin water resources to blackmail Pakistan shrinks the space for a substantial dialogue to mitigate mistrust between Islamabad and New Delhi.
To conclude, India’s foreign policy orientation, especially its hostile stance on Pakistan, will remain unchanged during the Modi-3.0 government.
