KABUL: Two years after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, countries worldwide began to normalize relations with the Taliban and Central Asian states are no exception.
But amid fears that Afghan rulers could destabilize the region or cause a water crisis, and with China and Russia heavily influencing regional security, Central Asian countries are treading cautiously.
Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s largest country, insists recognition of the Afghan group is off the table. In 2005, the country’s highest court added the Taliban to its list of terrorist organizations but it never deterred them from establishing trade with nations which battled and lost and were put under the graves.
Bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan has reached $1 billion in 2022, and Kazakh authorities reportedly want to increase this amount to $3 billion “soon.”
Afghanistan buys about 60% of its imported flour from Kazakh producers; earlier this month, the two sides signed $200 million in new trade deals, notably Kazakhstan’s commitments to supply even more basic foodstuffs to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan holds an important position as a transit country, and Kazakhstan recently used a new trade route sending trucks to Pakistan. via Afghanistan
Neighboring Uzbekistan has similar geo-economic goals. Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan also signed a tripartite agreement to connect the countries by rail and that happened not long ago.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are looking east to Pakistan as a major export destination for their goods, a strategy that could help reduce the former Soviet republics’ economic and political dependence on Russia. Afghanistan’s importance as a trade route to South Asia is a key reason why these countries, along with Kyrgyzstan, want to normalize relations with the Taliban.
However, doing business with the fundamentalist group will not be easy, especially for Uzbekistan. One reason is water.
Taliban are building a canal that could reduce the flow of Amu Darya River and it is a great for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which have a downstream location.
Uzbek and Turkmen farmers could suffer if the Taliban completes the Qosh Tepa canal, which is expected to turn the northern Afghan desert into farmland. There are even fears that Qosh Tepa could deplete Uzbekistan’s water supply and cause a crippling drought.
Despite these concerns, the Uzbek authorities are unlikely to jeopardize their relations with the Taliban over the project. Politicians in Tashkent know that if they try to prevent the construction of the canal, the Taliban could prevent Uzbekistan from using a rail route to Pakistan that provides access to seaports in South Asia.
Orientation in Tajikistan can be the most difficult. Dushanbe views Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a threat to Tajik national security and therefore supports anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan and abroad.
More importantly, Tajikistan has joined Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in signing a declaration that emphasizes “the priority importance of the rational use of the water resources of the Amu Darya River.”
Tajikistan in a way is sending a clear message that it does not approve building of the canal.
Central Asian states seem to share Washington’s vision of a post-American Afghanistan, where an inclusive, united, sovereign and self-sufficient country “respects the rights of its people, including women and girls, and is at peace with itself and its neighbors.” ”
Thus, even though American troops are no longer on the ground in Afghanistan, the countries of Central Asia appear as Washington’s partners in their approach to the Taliban government.
Pro-Kremlin media in the region are trying to upset this balance. Mars Sariev, a Kyrgyz political scientist, told a Russian-language newspaper published in Kyrgyzstan that the US would eventually use the Taliban to destabilize Central Asia and weaken Russian and Chinese positions in the strategically important region.
“In Afghanistan, all these radical movements are controlled by Western structures, as well as the Taliban,” Sariev said earlier this month. “That’s why the threat in northern Afghanistan against our republics is now growing.”
One thing is certain: With the latest iteration of the Taliban government two years old, Central Asian states will continue to tread carefully and coordinate their Afghan policy not only with the US, but also with Russia and China.
Washington could wash its hands of the troubled country in August 2021. Afghanistan’s neighbors do not have that luxury.
