Pakistan’s victory before the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is significant not merely because the Indus Waters Treaty has been declared fully operational, but because the tribunal has rejected the legal architecture on which India sought to justify its unilateral decision to put the 1960 water-sharing agreement “in abeyance”.
The ruling is important for another reason. It demonstrates that India’s political justification for suspending the treaty after the April 2025 attack in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) could not automatically translate into a legally valid ground for suspending an international treaty.
The Court of Arbitration was unequivocal: the treaty remains fully in force, India remains bound by its obligations, and its hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers remain subject to the treaty. The ruling was unanimous.
The result represents a substantial legal victory for Pakistan. But it is important to understand why Pakistan won and, equally importantly, why India’s arguments did not survive legal scrutiny.
India’s central argument: “abeyance” until Pakistan changes its conduct
India announced on April 22, 2025 that the Indus Waters Treaty would be held in abeyance until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably” abandoned what New Delhi alleged as support for cross-border terrorism. The so-called decision followed the deadly attack in Kashmir, which India, without any evidence, attributed to terrorists linked to Pakistan. Islamabad denied involvement.
The terminology itself became an important part of the legal dispute. India chose the word “abeyance”, apparently avoiding the more legally consequential terms “suspension” or “termination”.
But the tribunal found that “abeyance” is not a term used in the Indus Waters Treaty and has no technical meaning in international law. After examining India’s statements and conduct, the Court concluded that the substance of the Indian position could only amount to a claim that the Treaty had either been suspended or terminated.
That was the first major problem for New Delhi. Once “abeyance” was legally characterised as suspension or termination, India had to establish a recognised legal basis for doing so. It failed to do that.
First problem: the Treaty itself does not allow unilateral suspension
The Court first examined the text of the Indus Waters Treaty itself. Its conclusion was straightforward: the Treaty does not give either India or Pakistan a unilateral right to suspend or terminate it.
Instead, it provides that the agreement remains in force unless India and Pakistan together modify or terminate it through a further treaty. This is perhaps the most fundamental reason Pakistan prevailed.
Pakistan’s case was built around the proposition that a treaty cannot simply be switched off by one party because relations between the parties have deteriorated. The tribunal effectively accepted that proposition.
The principle is particularly important in the case of the Indus Waters Treaty because the agreement was designed to survive political hostility.
It has remained operative through wars, military crises and prolonged diplomatic breakdowns between India and Pakistan. The two countries had honoured the treaty since 1960 despite three wars and other conflicts. India therefore had to find a legal route outside the Treaty itself. That route also proved unsuccessful.
India invoked sovereignty – but sovereignty is not a licence to abandon treaties
One of New Delhi’s arguments was that its decision was justified by its sovereignty. The Court rejected that proposition in clear terms. International law does not recognise a general right allowing a state to suspend or terminate a treaty unilaterally simply by invoking sovereignty.
The tribunal relied on the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda – agreements must be kept. States that voluntarily enter into binding international agreements remain obliged to perform them. This finding has significance beyond the Indus dispute.
If sovereignty alone permitted a state to abandon treaty obligations whenever circumstances became politically unacceptable, the stability of international agreements would be seriously weakened.
The tribunal’s reasoning therefore placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute within a broader principle of international law: states cannot invoke sovereignty as a blanket escape from binding treaty obligations.
India’s “material breach” argument also collapsed
The court then examined whether Pakistan had committed a material breach of the Treaty that could have entitled India to suspend or terminate it. India had cited several grievances. One was Pakistan’s alleged unwillingness to enter negotiations to modify the Treaty.
The tribunal rejected this argument because the IWT contains no provision requiring Pakistan to enter such negotiations. More importantly, after examining the correspondence between the two countries, the court found that Pakistan had in fact been willing to discuss modifications to the Treaty.
India also objected to Pakistan’s opposition to Indian hydroelectric projects and to Pakistan’s use of the Treaty’s dispute-settlement mechanisms. Again, the argument did not work.
The court noted that the Treaty itself establishes mechanisms through which Pakistan can raise objections and pursue disputes. Exercising those rights cannot logically constitute a breach of the same Treaty. This is a particularly important aspect of the ruling.
Pakistan did not win by arguing that every Indian project was illegal. Rather, it successfully maintained that the Treaty itself provides mechanisms for resolving disagreements over Indian projects on the Western Rivers. Using those mechanisms is not a violation of the Treaty.
The terrorism argument: politically powerful, legally insufficient
India’s strongest political argument was terrorism. New Delhi argued that Pakistan’s alleged sponsorship of cross-border terrorism had fundamentally altered the relationship between the two countries and justified placing the Treaty in abeyance.
The court said it took the allegation seriously. But seriousness of an allegation is not the same as establishing a legally recognised ground for suspending a treaty. The tribunal found that even assuming India’s allegations were true, they did not establish a material breach of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Why? Because the Treaty governs rights and obligations concerning the use of the waters of the Indus river system. It does not regulate terrorism or the use of force.
Moreover, the court found no evidence that terrorism had prevented India from exercising its rights to construct hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers. On the contrary, India had continued constructing such projects, including in recent years.
In other words, the court separated two issues that India had sought to connect: security disputes between the two states and legal obligations under a water-sharing treaty. That separation was decisive.
The tribunal was not being asked to decide whether terrorism was serious, whether India had legitimate security concerns, or whether relations with Pakistan had deteriorated. It was being asked whether those circumstances provided a recognised legal basis for suspending the IWT. The answer was no.
What about changing circumstances?
India also relied on the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. New Delhi pointed to demographic changes, its growing need for clean energy, advances in dam technology, cross-border terrorism and climate change.
These arguments have an intuitive political appeal. The world of 1960 is obviously different from the world of 2026. But international treaty law sets a very high threshold before a state can invoke changed circumstances to escape a treaty obligation. The court found that the necessary conditions had not been met.
Some of the changes India identified were foreseeable when the Treaty was concluded. Others were not circumstances that constituted an essential basis of the parties’ consent to the Treaty. And, crucially, the changes had not radically transformed the extent of India’s obligations under the agreement. That distinction matters.
A treaty does not become legally obsolete merely because circumstances evolve. Otherwise, almost every long-term international agreement could be challenged whenever technology, demographics, economics or climate changed. The court’s reasoning therefore protected the durability of the IWT.
India also invoked armed conflict
Another possible route was the law relating to the effect of armed conflict on treaties. But here too India’s argument failed on two grounds.
The court found that there was no international armed conflict between India and Pakistan at the time of its decision. More importantly, it found that the Indus Waters Treaty was of a type that would remain operational even during armed conflict. History reinforced that conclusion: the Treaty had survived several armed conflicts since 1960.
That finding effectively undermines the proposition that a temporary military or security crisis automatically extinguishes the legal framework governing the Indus waters.
Finally, the “countermeasure” argument did not work
India’s action was also examined as a possible countermeasure against an alleged prior violation of international law by Pakistan. This was another important test.
A state may, under tightly restricted circumstances, take countermeasures in response to another state’s internationally wrongful conduct. But such measures have legal requirements and cannot simply be used as a convenient label for suspending treaty obligations. The tribunal found that the requirements for a lawful countermeasure had not been satisfied.
Among other concerns, the court noted that terminating or suspending the Treaty would affect India’s obligations concerning fundamental human rights, would not provide a mechanism for resuming its treaty obligations, and would prevent the Treaty’s own dispute-settlement provisions from operating. The countermeasure argument therefore provided no escape route.
Pakistan’s legal strategy proved stronger because it kept the dispute narrow
This is perhaps the most important lesson from the ruling. Pakistan did not need to persuade the tribunal that India had no security concerns, that relations between the two countries were normal, or that every Indian hydropower project violated the Treaty.
Its essential legal proposition was narrower: Whatever the political circumstances, India had not demonstrated a lawful basis for unilaterally suspending the Indus Waters Treaty. That proposition survived every legal test applied by the court.
The tribunal considered the Treaty itself, customary international law, material breach, fundamental change of circumstances, armed conflict and countermeasures. None provided India with a legal basis for its “abeyance” decision. That is why describing the decision merely as a “Pakistani victory” misses its deeper significance.
It was fundamentally a victory for the principle that binding international treaties cannot be unilaterally rewritten because political relations have deteriorated.
India’s boycott did not erase the proceedings
India’s present response is that the tribunal itself is illegitimate and lacks jurisdiction. New Delhi says it has never recognised the Court of Arbitration in these proceedings and considers it illegally constituted.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has said the tribunal has no jurisdiction to pronounce on India’s sovereign decisions and that its decision will have no effect on Indian actions concerning its projects.
This position, however, should be distinguished from the merits of India’s arguments on treaty suspension. The court had already rejected India’s jurisdictional objections in its 2023 Award on Competence.
The 2026 PCA summary records that India’s objections to the court’s competence were considered and rejected at that stage. More importantly, when India declined to participate in the latest phase, the tribunal did not simply assume that Pakistan’s arguments were correct.
It expressly said it would take India’s positions into account to the extent they could be discerned from Indian government communications, correspondence and public statements.
That means the legal rejection of India’s position cannot fairly be explained simply by saying that India was absent. The court tested the substance of India’s publicly stated case – and found it legally insufficient.
The Ratle order adds another layer to Pakistan’s victory
The ruling also has a practical dimension. Pakistan had asked for interim measures concerning India’s Ratle Hydro-Electric Plant pending the Neutral Expert’s determination of whether the project’s design complies with the Treaty.
The court unanimously imposed restrictions preventing India from concreting parts of the Ratle dam wall and power intake structure above specified levels until 90 days after the Neutral Expert’s final decision, currently expected in July 2027. India must also report changes to the construction schedule. This does not mean that the court has finally declared the entire Ratle project illegal. That distinction is important.
The underlying technical questions concerning the project’s compliance with the Treaty remain before the Neutral Expert. The interim measures are designed to prevent construction from moving so far ahead that a later finding of non-compliance becomes practically impossible or prohibitively expensive to remedy.
The court specifically noted the difficulty and cost of dismantling reinforced concrete if the design were subsequently found non-compliant.
What Pakistan has won – and what it has not
Pakistan has won a major legal point: India cannot unilaterally place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on the grounds it presented to the court. The Treaty remains legally operative. India remains bound by its obligations concerning the Western Rivers. And the Treaty’s dispute-settlement framework remains relevant.
But this should not be confused with an immediate mechanism forcing India to abandon every hydropower project Pakistan opposes. The court itself declined two of Pakistan’s requested interim measures. And the technical compliance questions concerning Ratle and Kishenganga remain subject to proceedings before the Neutral Expert. The real battle therefore moves to the next stage: implementation.
The difficult question now is enforcement
The Hague ruling has strengthened Pakistan’s legal position. But international law and international politics do not always move at the same speed. India has already rejected the ruling.
That means Islamabad’s challenge is no longer primarily about establishing what the Treaty says. The court has answered that question. The challenge is now how Pakistan can translate the legal victory into practical compliance.
This will require sustained diplomacy, careful use of the Treaty’s dispute-settlement mechanisms, international engagement and continued documentation of any actions that Pakistan considers inconsistent with the agreement. The temptation to portray the verdict as the final chapter should therefore be resisted. It is more accurately the opening of a new phase.
A victory for treaty law, not merely for Pakistan
The most consequential aspect of the Hague decision may ultimately lie beyond the Indus basin. The tribunal has reaffirmed a simple but fundamental proposition: international agreements cannot be made conditional upon the day-to-day state of political relations unless the treaty itself provides such an escape mechanism or a recognised rule of international law permits it.
India had several arguments – sovereignty, alleged material breach, terrorism, changed circumstances, armed conflict and countermeasures. The court examined them one by one. None survived. That is why Pakistan won.
Islamabad’s case rested on the legal continuity of an agreement that has governed one of the world’s most important transboundary river systems for more than six decades. New Delhi’s case sought to establish that extraordinary political and security circumstances allowed it to step outside that framework unilaterally. The court accepted the first proposition and rejected the second.
The political dispute between India and Pakistan is far from resolved. Nor does one arbitral ruling guarantee that tensions over water will disappear. But the legal position is now considerably clearer:
The Indus Waters Treaty is not in abeyance. It remains in force. And the disagreement between India and Pakistan over security, terrorism and hydropower must be addressed without simply switching off the treaty that governs their shared river system.
