When the Taliban swept back into power in Kabul in August 2021, many in the region hoped they had changed — that two decades of war had taught them the cost of harboring global militants. Yet, more than four years later, Afghanistan once again serves as a sanctuary for insurgent groups threatening not only Pakistan but the broader region.
This is not the first time Afghanistan has become a haven for transnational militancy. In the 1990s, the Taliban sheltered Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda — a decision that led to their regime’s downfall. Two decades on, history is repeating itself.
This time, the beneficiaries are Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), two groups responsible for hundreds of attacks inside Pakistan.
Despite Islamabad’s repeated pleas — and even veiled threats — to act against these groups, the Taliban regime remains unwilling to do so. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif recently warned that if diplomacy fails, “we are headed for an open war with Afghanistan.” His words reflect growing frustration in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, where officials increasingly see Kabul’s inaction as complicity.
Why the Taliban Won’t Act
The reasons behind this reluctance are both ideological and political. As Afghan affairs scholar William Maley explains, the Taliban see the TTP as a “brotherly movement,” united by common roots, shared jihadist history, and tribal kinship stretching back to the 1990s. Many in the Taliban’s leadership, particularly within the Haqqani Network, fought alongside the TTP against NATO and U.S. forces. These are not mere alliances of convenience — they are bonds forged in war.
The Brookings Institution’s Vanda Felbab-Brown adds another dimension: the Haqqani Network fears that any crackdown on TTP could push them into the arms of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), their ideological rival. The Taliban, therefore, view inaction as a lesser evil — even if it means straining ties with Pakistan.
The Kandahar-based Taliban leadership has grown increasingly arrogant and dismissive toward Pakistan, despite the country’s decades of support. Many of these Afghans were born or raised in Pakistan, and their families lived and studied here.
Yet, after returning to power, the Kandhari faction now dominates the Taliban’s decision-making and treats Islamabad with open suspicion. This sense of entitlement — combined with selective amnesia about who sustained them during their years of exile — has deepened the mistrust and widened the diplomatic gulf between the two neighbors.
From Fighters to Refugees — and Back
Since 2021, the TTP has re-emerged from its ashes. Thousands of its fighters and their families have settled across eastern Afghan provinces — Khost, Paktika, Paktia, and Kunar — where they enjoy freedom of movement and operational support. Pakistani intelligence reports suggest that Afghan Taliban commanders often act as facilitators, helping TTP fighters regroup after cross-border attacks.
The BLA, once confined to Pakistan’s Balochistan, has also found a foothold in Afghanistan. After losing ground in Pakistani operations, many BLA fighters fled to Nimroz and Helmand, provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan. Though the Taliban initially viewed the BLA with suspicion, the group has managed to establish semi-autonomous cells, benefiting from the chaotic terrain and limited Taliban oversight.
The Unholy Nexus
Perhaps the most alarming development is the growing collaboration between TTP and BLA. Despite stark ideological differences — one, claimed to be Islamist, the other secular-nationalist — the two groups now share logistics, intelligence, and even manpower. According to Pakistani security officials, the TTP has sold American-made weapons, abandoned by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to the BLA. There are also credible reports of TTP-trained suicide bombers being contracted by BLA cells for high-value missions.
This cooperation, Islamabad believes, is being financed and coordinated by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). While such claims are difficult to independently verify, intercepted communications between BLA commanders in Nimroz and operatives inside Pakistan confirm deep operational coordination.
Terrain of Terror
Pakistan has spent billions securing its 2,590-kilometer border with Afghanistan — fencing, surveillance towers, and fortified crossings at Torkham and Spin Boldak. Yet, the rugged mountains of Kurram, North Waziristan, and Zhob continue to offer porous routes for insurgents. In Balochistan, the TTP’s growing footprint in Qila Saifullah, Pishin, Ziarat, and Quetta underscores how Afghanistan’s instability spills directly into Pakistan’s western belt.
Echoes of the Past
For Pakistan, the irony is bitter. During the Soviet invasion and later the U.S.-NATO war, Islamabad was Afghanistan’s staunchest supporter — sheltering millions of refugees, lobbying for international engagement, and bearing enormous economic costs. Yet today, that goodwill has turned into a security nightmare. As one Pakistani delegate at recent Istanbul talks put it:
“Pakistan stood by Afghanistan in every crisis, but cannot allow its goodwill to be exploited by terrorist networks.”
A Dangerous Gamble
The Taliban’s refusal to act against TTP and BLA is more than mere defiance — it is a dangerous gamble that could backfire. By allowing their soil to be used for cross-border terrorism, they risk repeating the same mistake that destroyed their first regime. The difference this time is that the threat is not global but regional chaos — one that could engulf Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.
Unless Kabul moves decisively to dismantle these sanctuaries, the “Islamic Emirate” will remain hostage to the very militants it once called brothers. For the world, one question still lingers — why do the Taliban never learn from history?
