ISLAMABAD: More than seven decades since their emergence as neighbours, Pakistan and Afghanistan remain entangled in a relationship marked less by shared culture and faith, and more by mistrust and volatility. Despite geography dictating interdependence, political realities have kept ties fraught.
From Hamid Karzai to Ashraf Ghani, and now under Taliban rule, Kabul’s governments have often taken positions that leave Islamabad frustrated. The Soviet invasion, the U.S.-led war, and the Taliban’s return in 2021 have all shaped a dynamic where Pakistan has consistently borne the brunt of instability spilling across the border.
Unrealised expectations
For many in Pakistan’s strategic community, there was once an assumption that a Taliban-led government in Kabul would naturally be sympathetic, given the long years of sanctuary and support they enjoyed on Pakistani soil. That assumption proved misplaced.
Since seizing power, the Taliban have distanced themselves from Islamabad’s expectations of influence, asserting their autonomy in ways that frequently undercut Pakistani security concerns.
Political and security analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi points out:
“There was an overestimation within Pakistan that the Taliban regime would be compliant due to past support. But the Afghan Taliban, now in power, are driven more by ideological conviction and nationalist sentiment than by gratitude. Rizvi told WE News English”
Militancy at the heart of tensions
Nothing illustrates this divergence more starkly than the question of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). For Islamabad, the TTP’s continued presence on Afghan soil is not just a diplomatic irritant but an existential security threat. Despite repeated requests, Kabul has resisted acting decisively against these groups.
“Achieving stability in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations remains deeply complex and rooted in decades of geopolitical tension. But the current friction centers squarely on the TTP. Despite repeated requests, the Afghan Taliban refuse to act against them,” Rizvi said.
“Both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban share a similar worldview. That ideological closeness makes it unlikely that the Taliban authorities would take decisive action against the TTP.”
Afghan officials argue they are already overstretched battling ISIS-K and cannot risk opening another front. But for Pakistan, continued cross-border attacks – even after fencing much of the 2,600-kilometre frontier – remain intolerable.
Frictions on the border and beyond
Border management has also soured ties. Pakistan has introduced stricter visa and documentation requirements after deadly attacks linked to Afghan soil. Kabul, however, presses for an open border system at crossings such as Torkham and Chaman. Periodic closures have sparked tensions, underscoring how border disputes now mirror broader mistrust.
China has attempted to inject optimism by promoting regional economic initiatives, including the extension of CPEC into Afghanistan. While potentially transformative, such projects remain hostage to the unresolved political and security mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad.
Afghan refugees add another layer of complexity. Pakistan has hosted millions for decades, providing healthcare, education, and livelihoods. But efforts to regularise their presence now clash with Kabul’s calls for traditional cross-border fluidity.
Meanwhile, militant attacks in Pakistan declined by 22 percent between 12–18 September 2025, with 17 incidents recorded, but violence grew deadlier, mostly targeting security forces. Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the merged tribal districts remained hotspots, while Sindh saw limited activity. Militants used varied tactics, including suicide bombings and kidnappings, showing continued adaptability. Security forces intensified counter-terrorism operations, carrying out 16 intelligence-based actions that killed 92 militants.
A fragile status quo
Despite recent moves to elevate diplomatic representation, the relationship remains one of reluctant necessity. Afghanistan, landlocked and dependent on Pakistani trade routes, cannot afford isolation. Pakistan, for its part, cannot insulate itself from Afghan instability, no matter how robust its border controls. As Rizvi sums up:
“Both countries have limited options. They cannot afford to walk away from each other, but neither can they fully cooperate under current conditions. The status quo is tense, fragile, and likely to continue.”
In sum, the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan did not just alter Kabul’s political landscape—it reshaped Pakistan’s security reality. The sudden vacuum empowered militant outfits like the TTP, giving them access to advanced arms and equipment left behind by foreign troops. Pakistan, more than any other country, has paid the price of this negligence in blood and instability.
From 2021 to 2024, militant attacks in Pakistan rose by 209 percent, with 2024 alone witnessing over a thousand deaths and even more injuries—the highest toll in nearly a decade. This surge reflects not only the volume of attacks but also the enhanced lethality of militants who now operate with modern weaponry, night-vision devices, and armored vehicles.
Yet, despite such daunting odds, Pakistan’s security forces continue to stand firm, carrying the burden of protecting not just national but regional stability. Their sacrifices highlight both the resilience of the state and the urgent need for global recognition that abandoned foreign weaponry has directly fueled terrorism in Pakistan. Any serious international counter-terrorism effort must therefore support Islamabad’s fight to dismantle these networks before they cause further devastation.
